When fires raged across central Israel last month, Greece, Croatia, Italy, Egypt, and Cyprus all sent firefighting aircraft to help put out the flames; even the Palestinian Authority (PA) sent its firefighters to pitch in. In January, Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Egypt, and the PA formed an official consortium to cooperate in the extracting and exporting natural gas. These economic and civilian relationships also have diplomatic and military parallels, in the form of regular meetings and even joint military exercises. Taking stock of these developments, Eran Lerman highlights the shared goals of the emerging eastern Mediterranean alliance:

The [recent] IDF deployments to Cyprus, albeit scheduled long in advance, took place in the wake of the latest provocative acts by Turkey—prospecting in the Cypriot exclusive economic zone. This is but part of a pattern [of Ankara’s aggression against its local enemies]. Recep Tayyip Erdogan has repeatedly lashed out at Israel. His agents are trying to stir trouble in Jerusalem. He speaks of re-opening discussion of the demarcation of the Greek border in the Aegean. Turkey has meddled in Libya, supporting the Sarraj government in Tripoli, associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. The Turkish military now has bases in Qatar and Sudan. . . .

For Israel as well as for Sisi’s Egypt, their [respective] tripartite dialogues [with Athens and Nicosia] are also a useful check against problematic winds blowing from Brussels. Since high-level policy decisions in the European system require a general consensus, a close alliance with two members of the EU (or more, if Italy is to be counted) is an important guarantee for both countries against those who seek to impose their own perceptions on the complexities of the Egyptian domestic situation, or on the Israel-Palestinian struggle.

To all of this one might add aspects of cultural affinity, which is being brought into focus this week at the Méditerranée festival in Israel’s port city of Ashdod, bringing performers from Morocco, Greece, and places in-between. The renewed interest in Israel in the legacy of [the Egyptian-born Israeli novelist and journalist] Jaqueline Kahanoff, who sought to elevate the “Levantine” identity into a possible template for Israel’s future, bridging east and west, is another indicator.

Two extraordinary events demonstrate something important about Israel’s most fervent adversaries. One was a speech given at something called The People’s Forum (funded generously by Goldman Sachs), which stated, “When the state of Israel is finally destroyed and erased from history, that will be the single most important blow we can give to destroying capitalism and imperialism.”

The suggestion that this tiny state is the linchpin of a global, centuries-old phenomenon like capitalism goes well beyond anything resembling rational criticism. Even if Israel were guilty of genocide, apartheid, and oppression—which of course it is not—it would not follow that its destruction would help end capitalism or imperialism.

The other was an anti-Israel protest that took place in front of New York City’s Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center, deemed “complicit” in Israel’s evils. At organizers’ urging, participants shouted their slogans at kids in the cancer ward, who were watching from the windows. Given Hamas’s indifference toward the lives of Gazan children, such callousness toward non-Palestinian children from Hamas’s Western allies shouldn’t be surprising. The protest—like the abovementioned speech—deliberately conveyed the message that Israel is the ultimate evil and its destruction the ultimate good, cancer patients be damned.

The fact that Israel’s adversaries are almost comically perverse does not mean that they can be dismissed. If its allies fail to understand the obsessive and irrational hatred that it faces, they cannot effectively help it defend itself.