The rejection of tradition and authority as reliable sources of knowledge in favor of observation and ratiocination is typically taken as a basic premise of modern scientific thought. It is closely associated with René Descartes (1596-1650), who sought to build up knowledge of the world on the premise of doubting even the fact of his own existence. But, drawing on the work of the historian of science Thomas Kuhn, M. Anthony Mills argues that such an inherently anti-religious stance is not a necessary precondition for science:

Kuhn’s [argument] is that students learn first by imitation and practice and—assuming they receive a good education—once they strike out on their own, they will have been successfully inculcated into a particular scientific tradition. They will thus be prepared to recognize, pose, and solve scientific problems.

If we take tradition to be antithetical to scientific rationality, Kuhn’s conclusions will appear disquieting. And, indeed, Kuhn’s critics rejected his arguments as “irrationalist.” But if, on the contrary, we take tradition to be essential to rationality, then Kuhn’s conclusions will be not only acceptable but also unsurprising. According to the moral philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre, before we can begin to reason at all, we must first acquire the habits necessary to recognize and, ultimately, to replicate rational behavior. To do so, there must first be exemplars that we take to be authoritative—in the moral domain these will be exceptionally virtuous people, in the scientific domain, exceptionally good scientists. To become rational, in other words, one must be educated within a tradition of inquiry.

Science, on this view, is not Cartesian—at least as far as [the rejection of received ideas] is concerned—even if it remains eminently rational.

Where does this leave us? . . . [T]he fact that religious beliefs are not entirely reducible to empirical experience and partly depend upon tradition doesn’t make them irrational or even anti-scientific. Thus a popular way of opposing science and religion starts to look untenable. This hardly means the two become indistinguishable. But it does suggest that science and religion could be conceived of as distinct—but possibly harmonious, even sometimes mutually beneficial—traditions of rational inquiry.

Two extraordinary events demonstrate something important about Israel’s most fervent adversaries. One was a speech given at something called The People’s Forum (funded generously by Goldman Sachs), which stated, “When the state of Israel is finally destroyed and erased from history, that will be the single most important blow we can give to destroying capitalism and imperialism.”

The suggestion that this tiny state is the linchpin of a global, centuries-old phenomenon like capitalism goes well beyond anything resembling rational criticism. Even if Israel were guilty of genocide, apartheid, and oppression—which of course it is not—it would not follow that its destruction would help end capitalism or imperialism.

The other was an anti-Israel protest that took place in front of New York City’s Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center, deemed “complicit” in Israel’s evils. At organizers’ urging, participants shouted their slogans at kids in the cancer ward, who were watching from the windows. Given Hamas’s indifference toward the lives of Gazan children, such callousness toward non-Palestinian children from Hamas’s Western allies shouldn’t be surprising. The protest—like the abovementioned speech—deliberately conveyed the message that Israel is the ultimate evil and its destruction the ultimate good, cancer patients be damned.

The fact that Israel’s adversaries are almost comically perverse does not mean that they can be dismissed. If its allies fail to understand the obsessive and irrational hatred that it faces, they cannot effectively help it defend itself.