Last December, Bashar al-Assad’s forces, together with their Iranian and Russian allies, began a second major offensive into the northwestern province of Idlib, the country’s last major rebel stronghold. A few weeks later, Ankara—which until now has supported various rebel groups but kept its own intervention minimal—took an active role in the conflict, with its troops engaging in direct and extended clashes with Assad’s. Why, asks Jonathan Spyer, has Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan taken this particular moment to join in the fighting, when the civil war could very well be nearing an end?
At the most basic level, [Erdogan] fears the prospect of another wave of Syrian refugees entering Turkey. Around 3.6 million Syrians have already arrived there in the course of the civil war. This is far more than in any other country. . . . To prevent [an additional influx], and to have a chance of partly reversing the situation, Erdogan needs the Idlib rebel enclave to survive.
But there is more than the refugee issue at stake here. Erdogan supported the Sunni Arab rebellion in Syria earlier and harder than any other leader. His backing of it forms a part of the broader, erratic, and floundering foreign policy in which he has sought to set himself up as the natural leader of Sunni Arab causes and of political Islam in the Arabic-speaking world.
To accept the complete crushing of the Syrian rebellion at this juncture would constitute a humiliating blow to the Turkish leader. It would severely tarnish his strongman image, and perhaps stretch the credulity of his adoring base at home beyond breaking point.
But, Spyer continues, there is little chance that a full-scale Turkish-Syrian war will erupt, primarily because Erdogan doesn’t want to find himself facing off with Vladimir Putin:
Moscow has a treaty-based alliance with the Assad regime. Assad owes his survival to Putin. But Russia also has a strategic objective of drawing Turkey away from the West. This effort has been proceeding well over the last half-decade. . . . At its heart, Turkey is a revanchist power, seeking to grow at the expense of the retreating U.S.-led order in the Middle East. Moscow also wants to upturn that order. [Thus], in spite of local differences, [Turkey’s] natural strategic connection is to Russia, which sees Turkey as a major prize. If winning it means that Assad has to wait a while before planting his flag along the border, Putin is likely to make him wait. [Ultimately], Russia remains the decider in Syria west of the Euphrates.
Read more on Middle East Forum: https://www.meforum.org/60536/turkish-syrian-conflict