Taking into account some key events in the decade since Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, Yossi Kuperwasser draws several conclusions:
First, the Palestinian Authority is not capable of controlling a territory on its own. . . .
[Furthermore], unilateral concessions [by Israel] are perceived in the region as signs of weakness, and hence invite additional pressure. Conversely, demonstrating resolve discourages pressure. The unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon [in 2000] encouraged the Palestinians to choose confrontation and launch the second intifada. The disengagement [from Gaza] convinced the extremist elements among the Palestinians, along with Hizballah, to continue the armed struggle, including a focus on kidnappings [which eventually led to the 2006 Lebanon war]. . . .
[Finally], the political benefit from unilateral concessions is temporary and illusory. It is not possible to translate such concessions into sustainable political achievements. Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza was not acknowledged as the end of an occupation. . . . The campaign of delegitimization against Israel continued.